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Comparative advantage is the most important foundation for world trade. Yet comparative 
advantage is usually explained by a series of unrelated models. We present a general model that 
incorporates all three distinct sources of comparative advantage: differences in technologies, 
differences in factor endowments, and differences in external economies of scale. Apart from 
being a versatile teaching tool, this model is especially appropriate for describing the trade pattern 
between developed and developing economies and for analyzing some important issues of trade 
policy and industrialization relevant for developing economies. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Comparative advantage is the most important determinant of world trade, especially 
the trade between developed and developing economies, or the North-South trade. In 
textbooks on international trade, comparative advantage is usually explained with a series of 
different models. Each model highlights a different source of comparative advantage. The 
Ricardian model attributes comparative advantage to the differences in labor productivity, 
the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model to differences in factor endowments, and the model with 
external economies of scale to the differences in the scale effect. In most empirical studies as 
well as in theoretical analysis, there is a tendency or presumption to treat different models of 
comparative advantage only one at a time. For example, studies that attempt to test the HO 
model rarely pay attention to the role of other factors than the differences in factor 
endowments. 
In the real world, these three sources of comparative advantage are all important. The 
objective of the present paper is to propose a general trade model that incorporates all three 
distinct sources of comparative advantage. Though most of the major analytical results are 
not new, such a model can be a very useful tool for teaching theories of international trade. 
More importantly, we argue that such a general model of comparative advantage can provide 
a particularly fitting framework for describing the North-South trade and analyzing issues of 
trade policy and industrialization relevant for most developing economies. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain why a trade model 
with external economies of scale is still useful and relevant, despite the recent development 
of trade models with intra-industry trade, internal economies of scale and imperfect 
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competition. Then, we present the model in  Section  III and apply it to analyze the 
North-South trade in Section IV. The last section offers concluding comments. 
 
II. The Relevance of External Economies of Scale 
 
Economists have long recognized the presence of economies of scale, especially in 
industry. The existence of economies of scale is widely documented and recently surveyed in 
Junius (1997). There has long been a perception that diminishing returns are prevalent in 
agriculture while increasing returns characterize industry. That is why industrialization is the 
key to economic development because it provides a source for sustained productivity growth. 
Among industries, there is a general pattern that economies of scale tend to be larger in 
capital-intensive, skills-intensive or technologically advanced sectors than in labor-intensive 
sectors. The former tends to be dominated by a few large multinational corporations, while 
the latter is populated by numerous small-scaled firms. 
Though the prevalence of economies of scale in industry, especially in capital- 
intensive and technologically advanced sectors, has long been recognized, the theoretical 
work to model economies of scale has been plagued with difficulties. In particular, an 
extremely vexing implication of economies of scale is that they are inherently incompatible 
with the market structure of perfect competition, an economists’ fiction but nevertheless 
extremely useful abstraction for most economic theories. The traditional solution to this 
quandary is to confine what we can analyze to external economies of scale, which is 
compatible with perfect competition. Ethier (1982) probably represents a last serious attempt 
at theoretical modeling of the relationship between external economies of scale and trade 
pattern. 
Despite some theoretical weaknesses, the trade model of external economies of scale 
captures an important aspect of the observed trade pattern. In the real world, small new 
entrants and large established incumbents do not always compete on an equal footing. In 
scale-intensive industries, the latter has a clear comparative advantage against the former. 
That advantage is derived not only from static economies of scale, but also from dynamic 
economies of scale, which are often called the learning-by-doing effect in other contexts. In 
other words, larger established producers often enjoy the advantage of high productivity due 
to their accumulated experience. To the extent that some form of technology is privately 
owned, it is not always straightforward to distinguish, especially in empirical studies, the 
scale effect and technological superiority. Though a trade model is usually static by nature, 
the trade model of external economies of scale should really be interpreted loosely so as to 
incorporate the effects of both static and dynamic economies of scale.   
It is well known that the presence of external economies of scale results in some messy 
properties. One problem is path dependency. A small initial advantage would be turned into 
prevailing dominance through the self-reinforcement mechanism. While this property is 
messier to handle analytically, it captures an essential aspect of the real world in which trade 
pattern is also influenced by time and history. Another problem is the existence of multiple 
equilibria. In the context of international trade, the model can explain the resulting trade 
pattern in terms of the scale effect, but cannot predict a unique initial pattern of trade. Also 
troublesome is the possibility that among multiple equilibria, the equilibrium that shapes the XU: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND THE NORTH-SOUTH TRADE 
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initial pattern of trade may not be the globally efficient. Despite these known displeasing 
properties, the trade model of external economies of scale is still relevant and useful. 
The 1980s witnessed a surge of interest in developing trade models o f internal 
economies of scale, product differentiation, and imperfect competition. Though these new 
trade models appear nicer and more sophisticated, they cannot replace the trade model with 
external economies of scale. This is because such models are mainly designed to explain the 
nature and structure of intra-industry trade, not to account for inter-industry trade and 
comparative advantage. While intra-industry trade accounts for an important part of total 
world trade, especially the trade among developed economies, it is not the only phenomenon 
generated by economies of scale. Inter-industry trade is also shaped by economies of scale. 
Though new trade theories of increasing returns and imperfect competition, especially 
the popular Helpman-Krugman (1985) m odel of monopolistic competition and product 
differentiation, are said to compliment and coexist with the HO model, the integration of 
these two models is artificial. The integrated model as expounded in Helpman and Krugman 
(1985) does not explain under what conditions the status of a good can be altered from 
belonging to intra-industry trade to inter-industry trade. For instance, the passenger car 
industry is often cited as an example to demonstrate intra-industry trade based product 
differentiation. But the integrated model cannot account for a puzzling question: why can 
Korea produce cars and participate in such intra-industry trade among developed economies, 
whereas Taiwan cannot, even though Taiwan appears to be more developed than Korea in 
terms of GDP per capita? In sum, new trade theories of internal economies of scale cannot be 
used to account for inter-industry trade based on comparative advantage and the switch 
between inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade. 
 
III. A Trade Model with External Economies of Scale 
 
Now we turn to specify our model. Consider a simple trade model with two goods and 
two factors. Technologies are represented by the Cobb-Douglas production function form for 
simplicity. Assume that sector 1 is labor-intensive and is characterized by constant returns to 
scale (CRS). The production function is as follows: 
 
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
a a - = L K A S ,                                                      (1) 
 
where S1, K1, L1 are the output, capital and labor inputs of sector 1, a 1 is the capital share of 
cost, and A1 is the productivity parameter. 
In contrast, sector 2 is assumed to be capital-intensive and exhibits external economies 
of scale. Though there is no well-established theory for the relationship between the capital 
intensity and scale intensity of a sector, empirical observation suggests (Junius (1997)) that 
many capital-intensive industries tend to be scale-intensive, too. Specifically, the technology 
for sector 2 is specified as follows: 
 
2 2 1
2 2 2 2 2
a a e - = L K A S S ,                                                  (2) 
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where 0 £ e < 1 is the scale parameter, S2, K2, L2 are the output, capital and labor inputs of 
sector 2, a 2 is the capital share of cost, and A2 is the productivity parameter. Rearranging 
Equation (2), we can see, as shown in Equation (3), that for the sector 2 as a whole, S2 
exhibits increasing returns to scale (IRS) in K2 and L2. 
 
( ) e a a - - = 1
1
1
2 2 2 2
2 2 L K A S .                                                 (3) 
 
The scale effect we consider here is external. In other words, individual private firms 
treat the term, S2
e, as if it is part of the parameter, A2. Therefore, the private marginal product 
of labor (PMP) is 
   
e a a 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 ) / ( ) 1 ( S L K A PMP L - = .                                        (4) 
 
However, the social marginal product of labor has to include the external scale effect. 
It is easy to derive the relationship between the private and social marginal products (SMP) 
of factors, for the social marginal product of labor is related to the private marginal product 
of labor in a simple way, as below: 
 
) 1 /( 2 2 e - = L L PMP SMP .                                               (5) 
 
The social and private marginal products of capital can be derived similarly. The 
present way that the external scale effect is specified does have a convenient property. It 
implies that the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) is independent of the scale of 
S2. In other words, the optimal capital intensity of sector 2 is a function of the wage-rental 
ratio only, w  = w/r, just as the optimal capital intensity of sector 1 is. Accordingly, the 
optimal capital-labor ratios in both sectors depend only on the wage-rental ratio: 
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.                                          (6) 
 
Equation (6) has two interpretations. One is the optimal condition of cost minimization. 
The other is that it is the efficient condition that defines the private production possibility 
frontier (PPF). It means that the ratio of the two marginal products of labor is equalized with 
the ratio of the two marginal products of capital. Therefore, on the margin, there is no gain 
for private firms to reallocate either labor or capital from one sector to the other. 
Derived from cost minimization, the two unit cost functions corresponding to the two 
production functions are as follows: 
 
1 1 1
1 1
a a r w B p
- = ,                                                       (7) 
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 XU: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND THE NORTH-SOUTH TRADE 
  73 
where pi are the two product prices and Bi are scale parameters related to Ai . Equation (6) 
provides the link between the cost functions, Equations (7)-(8), and the production functions, 
Equations (1)-(2).   
As can be seen, a major consequence of introducing the scale effect is that the unit cost 
in sector 2 is no longer independent of the scale of S2, as in the case of sector 1 with CRS. 
Therefore, the two above equations, Equations (7)-(8), can no longer determine uniquely the 
two factor prices in terms of the two goods prices, or the other way round. 
Taking the ratio of Equations (7)-(8), we get an expression for the relative price of 
good 2 in terms of good 1,   
 
e a a w
- - = = 2 1 2 1 2
2 1 ) / ( / S B B p p p .                                          (9) 
 
As will elaborated in Section IV, this equation can be regarded as a general framework 
for analyzing the determination of comparative advantage by three independent sources. But 
for the moment, let us continue to specify the rest of the model. As is well known, the factor 
requirements per unit of output are the same as the derivatives of the two unit cost functions 
with respect to the two factor prices, w and r, as shown below: 
 
1
1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) (
a w a w
- - = B aL ,                                                 (10) 
 
1 1
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- = B aK ,                                                  (11) 
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The presence of the scale effect alters the usual shape of the PPF. The PPF is defined 
as S1 = T(S2), the maximum S1 for a given S2. Analytically, the PPF is defined by the solution 
of Li and Ki , i = 1, 2, from the four equations system consisting of Equation (2) and Equation 
(6) and the following two equations of factor market equilibrium 
 
L1 + L2 = L ,                                                        (14) 
 
K1 + K2 = K .                                                       (15) 
 
Once L1 and K1 are solved for a given S2, S1 is given by Equation (1). To make it easier 
to grasp the implications of the scale effect, we illustrate the properties of the present model 
with a numerical example shown in Table 1.
1 The values of parameters and exogenous 
variables are given in the note of Table 1. 
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The first property to note is that as resources are reallocated from the labor-intensive 
sector to the capital-intensive sector, the capital intensities of both sectors, k1 and k2, decrease 
correspondingly. In Table 1, the values of S1, S2 and k1, k2 are shown in Rows 1-2 and Rows 
5-6. Reading from left to right, one can see how the structure of the economy changes as S2 
increases from zero to the maximum level. That k1 and k2 fall with the increase in S2/S1 is a 
property of the HO model and comes directly from the model structure that the capital 
intensities of the two sectors are different. As the labor-intensive sector contracts and the 
capital-intensive sector expands, excess supply of labor and excess demand for capital are 
generated at the initial capital-labor ratios. Hence, to restore factor market equilibrium, both 
sectors need to employ more labor-intensive production techniques. 
The second property is that as the production methods in both sectors become more 
labor-intensive (k1 and k2 fall), the wage-rental ratio (w ) decreases accordingly as described 
by Equation (6) and shown in Row 12 of Table 1. In other words, the relative output supply 
ratio, S2/S1, is positively related to the wage-rental ratio, w . This is also a familiar property of 
the HO model.   
Having established these preliminary results, we can show the main implication of 
introducing economies of scale: the effect on the slope of the PPF or the relationship between 
p and S2/S1. As is shown in Table 1, as S2 rises from zero to the maximum, the relative price 
of good 2 falls first, and then rises as is in the case in a model with CRS. In Table 1, as 
shown by Row 9, the minimum p is 0.89 corresponding to S2 = 30.33.
2 In other words, the 
presence of economies of scale has resulted in multiple equilibria. This is a fairly general 
implication of introducing external economies of scale into a standard trade model. 
What explains the unusual shape of the relative product supply function? Equation (9) 
provides the clue to the puzzle. In the absence of the scale effect, p is monotonically linked 
to w  when sector 2 is the capital-intensive sector. As w   falls,  p rises. This is what the 
well-known Stolper-Samuelson theorem describes. Now, on top of that effect, there is a 
separate scale effect on p through the scale of S2. The term, S2
e, falls monotonically with the 
increase in S2, pulling down p. However, by its very nature, the effect of S2
e is more 
pronounced when S2 is small than when it is large. Hence, as shown by Table 1, the scale 
effect outweighs the influence of a falling w  initially, but thereafter, the influence of a falling 
w  reasserts itself on p, as the scale effect tapers off. 
In the market equilibrium, the relative price of good 2, p, is equal to the ratio of the 
private marginal product of a factor in sector 1 to that in sector 2. However, for the society as 
a whole, the slope of the PPF, as a measure of the social opportunity cost of producing good 
1, is the ratio of the social marginal product of a factor in sector 1 to that in sector 2. As a 
result, p and d(S2/dS1) are related in the following way: d(S2/dS1) = p/(1ꎭe). Intuitively, the 
slope of the PPF is larger than p because the private sector ignores the external scale effect. 
Next, we turn to analyze the properties of the GDP function, i.e., the response of the 
four endogenous variables, S1, S2, w, and r to changes in p1, p2, L and K. The GDP function 
(Y) can, of course, be defined in two alternative ways as follows: 
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rK wL S p S p L K p p Y + = + = 2 2 1 1 2 1 ) , , , ( .                                  (16) 
 
In turn, the equilibrium conditions underlying the GDP function are as follows: 
 
0 , 1
1
1 1
1 1 ‡ £
- S r w B p
a a ,                                               (7B) 
 
0 , / 2 2
1
2 2
2 2 ‡ £
- S S r w B p
e a a ,                                         (8B) 
 
L1 + L2 = L,   L1, L2 ‡ 0,                                             (14B) 
 
K1 + K2 = K,   K1, K2 ‡ 0,                                            (15B) 
 
where L1 = aL1(w )S1 and K1 = aK1(w )S1, L2 = aL2(w , S2)S2 and K2 = aK2(w , S2)S2. Row 13 of 
Table 1 gives the value of GDP with the unit of labor being the numéraire (w = 1.0). 
To complete the model, utility is represented by a simple Cobb-Douglas function: 
 
U = D1
bD2
1-b,
                                                      (17A) 
 
where  U  is utility,  D1, D 2 are the demands for the two goods, and b  is the constant 
expenditure share of good 1. For some purposes, it is more convenient to express utility in 
terms of income and prices. The indirect utility function ( V) corresponding to Equation 
(17A) is: 
 
( ) b b
b b b b -
- - = 1
2 1
1 ) 1 (
p p
Y
V .                                          (17B) 
 
In Table 1, Row 14 shows the level of utility. The demands for the two goods can be 
derived from Equation (17A). Since the derivation is simple and well known, it is omitted 
here. With the two demands, we can compute the two net export functions that describe the 
trade pattern. The numerical values of the two net export functions are shown in Rows 3-4. 
In sum, Rows 1-14 of Table 1 provides a complete description of the model over the entire 
range of diversification as well as the two limit cases of complete specialization. 
How does the present model differ from the HO model? Whereas in the HO model, the 
set of the perfect competition conditions used to solve w and r is independent of the set of the 
full employment conditions used to solve S1 and S2, the four endogenous variables (w, r, S1, 
S2) must be solved simultaneously from  these four equations in the present model. In the HO 
model, the recursive structure makes it possible to separate the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
from the Rybczynski theorem. But in the present model, such a separation is no longer valid. 
In the presence of multiple equilibria, a tricky issue is to specify how the economy 
would respond to changes in p. In the present model, there are two reasons why the economy 
would always prefer the larger scale of S2 to the smaller scale. This is because, on the one 
hand, the market equilibrium associated with the larger value of S2 yields a higher level of 
welfare, as shown in Row 14 of Table 1. The intuitive explanation for this result is that as S2 XU: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND THE NORTH-SOUTH TRADE 
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increases, the economy becomes more efficient in that the scale effect m akes it feasible to 
produce more output of the two goods with the fixed factor supplies. With more output and 
income come higher levels of welfare.   
On the other hand, the market equilibrium associated with the larger value of S2 is also 
stable in the sense that in the neighborhood of the equilibrium, there is a tendency in the 
economy to restore the equilibrium. In contrast, the market equilibrium associated with the 
smaller equilibrium value of S2 is unstable, because a deviation from it will move the 
economy either to complete specialization in good 1 or to the larger equilibrium S2.   
These two considerations suggest that in the absence of restrictions, the economy 
would always choose to produce the larger equilibrium output of S2 for a given p. In this way, 
we can resolve the indeterminacy of the relation between goods supplies and prices. The 
scale of  S2 corresponding to the minimum  p can have an intuitive meaning. It can be 
interpreted as the minimum efficient scale (MES) of S2 (in Table 1, it is represented by the 
column for S2 = 30.33). When p falls below that floor, the economy would shift to the limit 
case of complete specialization in good 1. 
It is important to realize that in the present model, the MES of S2 depends on the 
magnitude of the Stolper-Samuelson effect, i.e., the relationship between p and w  exclusive 
of the influence of the scale effect. In the absence of such an offsetting Stolper-Samuelson 
effect, the MES of  S2 is the maximum feasible scale as constrained by the fixed factor 
supplies of an economy. 
In sum, the GDP function can still be concave to the origin in the presence of IRS, if 
our solution of the multiple equilibria problem is accepted. But there is a qualitative 
difference between the model with CRS and the model with IRS. In the former, the GDP 
function is continuous, as S2 approaches zero and S1 approaches the maximum specialization 
limit. But in the latter, the GDP function becomes discontinuous at 
MES S2  and S2 jumps to 
zero from 
MES S2 . 
Having specified how goods supplies respond to changes in goods prices, we can 
deduce directly the relationship between goods prices and factor prices, as shown by Rows 9 
and 12 of Table 1. What happens to the Stolper-Samuelson effect in the present model? We 
have already shown that w  is negatively related to S2/S1 through the changes in k1 and k2. It 
follows that like S2/S1, w  is not a unique function of p. In the range of S2 from 0 to 
MES S2 , w  
is positively related to p. But in the range of S2 from 
MES S2  to the maximum feasible scale, w  
is negatively related to p. Since our solution of the multiple equilibria problem has excluded 
the combination of a falling p and a rising S2/S1 from the equilibrium set of output mix, it 
also rules out the positive relationship between p and w  over the range of S2 ˛ [0, 
MES S2 ]. 
Therefore, we conclude that a modified Stolper-Samuelson theorem,  i.e., a negative 
relationship between p and w  over the range of  S2  ˛ [
MES S2 , 
MAX S2 ], still applies to the 
present model. 
Turning our attention to real factor prices, it is useful to note that in sector 1, the 
marginal products of labor and capital depend only on k1. Therefore, as k1 falls with the rise 
in p2 and S2, the marginal product of labor (w/p1) falls and the marginal product of capital 
(r/p1) rises in sector 1. In sector 2, the marginal products of the two factors also depend on JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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the scale of S2. In the case of capital, the falling k2 and the scale effect of a rising S2 work in 
the same direction so that r/p2 rises unambiguously. But in the case of labor, the falling k2 
and the scale effect of a rising S2 offset each other. But just as the influence of a falling w  
dominates the scale effect in determining p, so does the effect of a falling k2 on w/p2. 
What happens to the Rybczynski theorem in the present model? The presence of the 
scale effect alters the standard HO model in two important ways. On the one hand, the factor 
requirements per unit of output in sector 2 now depend on the scale of S2. However, if we 
re-define the output variable to be  S2
1-e, then, holding factor prices unchanged, the 
Rybczynski theorem still applies to S1 and S2
1-e. An increase in K with L being unchanged 
would increase S2
1-e and reduce S1 when the wage-rental ratio, w , is held constant. It follows 
that the S2/S1 ratio will increase more proportionately with the increase in the K/L ratio. 
On the other hand, a change in the scale of S2 now affects w . Since the direct effect of 
a rise in K with an unchanged L is to raise S2, the effect on w  of a rise in S2 is similar to that 
of a rise in p. In other words, w  would fall in response to a rise in S2. In turn, a fall in w  
would induce lower k1 and k2. Consequently, the indirect effect through w  reinforces the 
direct effect, creating excess supply in the capital market and excess demand in the labor 
market at the unchanged S1 and S2. Therefore, to restore equilibrium, S2 must increase and S1 
decrease at unchanged p. Combining the two separate effects, it follows that a rise in the K/L 
ratio will raise the S2/S1 more than proportionately. In other words, the scale effect reinforces 
the pure Rybczynski effect. 
 
IV. The North-South Trade 
 
The model presented above is not new. However, it has never been fully appreciated 
that such a model can be extremely useful as a general theory of comparative advantage with 
three distinct sources and as a particularly fitting framework for analyzing issues of 
industrialization relevant to developing countries. In this section, we first illustrate how the 
present model incorporates three distinct sources of comparative advantage and then apply 
the model to issues of economic development. 
Now suppose that there is a foreign economy with which the home economy trades. 
Let all the corresponding variables of the foreign economy denoted with ‘*’. There is an 
equation corresponding to Equation (8) for the foreign economy. Taking the ratio of the 
foreign relative product price (
* p ) to the domestic relative product price (p), we derive a 
general expression of comparative advantage. 
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Each of the three terms in Equation (18) denotes a distinct source of comparative 
advantage: technological differences à la the Ricardian model, endowment differences à la 
the HO model, and differences in the scale effect. Let us elaborate each in turn. 
Differences in factor endowments  determine, in the HO model, a pattern of 
comparative advantage. Usually, the HO theorem is stated in a model in which there is XU: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND THE NORTH-SOUTH TRADE 
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equalization of factor prices under free trade. The economy with relatively more endowment 
of capital produces more the capital-intensive good than it consumes. Comparative 
advantage is reflected in the resulting trade pattern. However, diversification in production 
and equalization of factor prices are rather special properties of the two goods-two factors 
textbook model. In more general models,  e.g., models with more goods than factors, 
differences in factor endowments are reflected, as discussed in Xu (1993), in differences in 
factor prices. The economy endowed with relatively more capital has a higher wage-rental 
ratio, w , which implies, in turn, a comparative advantage in capital-intensive goods. The 
more capital-intensive a good is, the more pronounced the comparative advantage in that 
good of the economy is. In the present model, we can presume that the country with 
relatively more capital endowment would have a higher w  in autarky. Then, Equation (18) 
tells, ceteris paribus, that w
* > w  would imply p
* < p. 
Whereas the Heckscher-Ohlin model assumes that all countries have access to the 
same technology, the Ricardian model recognizes explicitly that rich countries are more 
advanced technologically than poor countries. In the well-known Ricardo’s example of 
comparative advantage, England has a comparative advantage in cotton, even though 
England is less efficient than Portugal in producing both cotton and wine. In textbooks, the 
Ricardian model usually has only one factor, labor. Though the principle of comparative 
advantage can be adequately illustrated by way of a one-factor trade model, the Ricardian 
concept of technological differences-based comparative advantage is a fairly general concept 
that can be applied to models with any number of factors. It is a gross misconception that the 
Ricardian model is confined to or handicapped by having only one factor.
3 In the present 
model, we can allow both 
*
1 B <B1 and 
*
2 B <B2. In other words, the foreign economy is more 
technologically advanced in both sectors than the home economy. But if the foreign 
economy is relatively more efficient in the capital-intensive sector than the home economy is, 
i.e., 
*
2 B /
*
1 B < 1 2/B B , then it has, ceteris paribus, a comparative advantage in that good, i.e., 
p
* < p. It is important to realize that the Ricardian model and the Heckscher-Ohlin model are 
not mutually exclusive. They can be complementary to each other because they point to two 
independent determinants of comparative advantage. 
In addition to these two determinants of comparative advantage, the scale effect can be 
a third independent determinant. If 
*
2 S >S2, then ceteris paribus, it would cause p
* < p so 
that the foreign economy has a comparative advantage in the scale-intensive good. As 
explained in Section II, it is better to interpret the scale-induced comparative advantage in 
terms of the competition between large established incumbents and small new entrants. In 
the real world, time and history also play a critical role in shaping existing patterns of 
comparative advantage, even though most theoretical trade models are constructed under a 
static framework. 
In sum, Equation (18) can be regarded as a general expression for the determination of 
comparative advantage. In the real world, these three determinants of comparative advantage 
 
3. Even Helpman (1999), a distinguished trade economist, has the misconception that the weakness of the Ricardian 
model is to have only one factor of production. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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are all important and relevant in shaping the pattern of world trade. Though in both 
theoretical work and empirical studies, most of attention in the international trade literature 
has been given to the HO model, the roles played by the other two determinants of 
comparative advantage should not be overlooked. However, i t is difficult to disentangle 
empirically the distinct contribution of each factor to the determination of the world trade 
pattern. 
What is the use of the present general model of comparative advantage? Besides 
offering a neat pedagogical tool to synthesize three distinct theories of comparative 
advantage, it provides a particularly fitting framework for analyzing the North-South trade. It 
is obvious that the North-South trade is, by and large, inter-industry trade based on 
comparative advantage. In terms of the present model, the North trades good 2 for good 1 
with the South. 
Why does the North have a comparative advantage in good 2? It has long been an 
undisputed view that the North has comparative advantage in the capital-intensive good and 
the South in the labor-intensive good. This is because the North has more capital per worker 
than the South. Reflecting the predominant influence of the HO model, this view is generally 
consistent with observed empirical regularities. 
However, that view does not reflect fully the nature of the North-South trade. It is a 
gross distortion of reality to pretend that the South is as advanced technologically as the 
North. Harrigan (1997) has found that the assumption of identical technologies is not valid 
even among developed economies. In general, it is reasonable to expect that the technological 
gap between the North and the South is much wider among technologically sophisticated 
products. Therefore, the North has a comparative advantage in producing technology- 
intensive products. In this light, the North-South trade can be portrayed as an exchange of 
high-tech products for low-tech products. Though capital intensity and technology intensity 
are two separate dimensions of tradable products, it is not too much an exaggeration that the 
two characteristics are somewhat correlated. In the context of the North-South trade, we can 
assume that the two indices, 
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  point to the same direction. 
Turning to differences in economies of scale, it is fair to presume, in a general way, 
that the firms in the South are small and less experienced, while those in the North are large 
and long established. Being more industrialized, the North has a longer history of producing 
capital-intensive and scale-intensive goods and thus enjoys a larger scale of production in 
such goods and benefits from more experience. A particularly fitting example is car 
manufacturing. Under this perspective, the assumption of S2 < 
*
2 S  describes well another 
important difference between the North and the South. 
Taken together, these three differences between the North and the South generate a 
trade pattern that the South trades labor-intensive, low-tech, and less scale-intensive goods 
for capital-intensive, high-tech, and more scale-intensive goods with the North. Of course, in 
teaching theories of international trade, we usually make use of small two-sector trade 
models that highlight the role of one factor at a time. However, there is often a tendency that 
the view on world trade patterns is unduly constrained by an excessively narrow focus that 
overshadows numerous empirical trade studies and policy forums. Apart from the three XU: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND THE NORTH-SOUTH TRADE 
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determinants of comparative advantage discussed above, there is another important 
dimension of the North-South trade that is relevant but difficult to be incorporated in our 
model. This is the feature that the markets for the exports of developing economies tend to be 
highly competitive, while those for the exports of developed economies tend to be less 
competitive and dominated by large multinational corporations. 
What kind of policy implications can be drawn from our general model of comparative 
advantage? Trade economists generally believe in the optimality of free trade for both 
developed and developing economies. However, there is a widely held feeling among policy 
makers in developing economies that free trade does not always work to their advantage. The 
present model provides three sound justifications for an active trade policy in the South to 
promote and assist capital-, technology-, and scale-intensive sectors.   
The presence of the external economies of scale provides the first justification. As is 
well known in economics, the presence of an externality signifies a market failure. A 
government action that corrects the market failure would improve economic efficiency. In 
the present context, the scale of S2 in the market equilibrium is smaller than what is socially 
optimal. Therefore, if the South imports good 2, then a tariff on the imports of good 2 may 
expand the domestic production of good 2 to the socially optimal level. The remedy for such 
market failures is well understood and does not need further elaboration. 
The second justification for an active trade policy is that as an importer of good 2, the 
South will become worse off under free trade than when it restricts trade. As described above, 
the South has a comparative disadvantage in good 2 because it has less capital per worker, 
less technological capacity, produces at a smaller scale. If the South already produces good 2 
under protection, trade liberalization would entail in a contraction in the output of good 2 and 
an expansion in the output of good 1 in the South. But from Table 1, we can see that such a 
reallocation of resources in the South reduces welfare, instead of raising welfare.   
What is the intuition behind this result? Actually, this is a fairly general result from the 
models that incorporate external economies of scale. In general, a contraction of the 
scale-intensive sector as a result of free trade will always reduce welfare, so long as the 
economy remains as a producer of the scale-intensive good. Intuitively, a reduction in the 
output of the scale-intensive good would always make an economy less technologically 
efficient due to the scale effect. To put it in another way, the scale effect plays a role similar 
to shifting the PPF under CRS. As the production of the scale-intensive good contracts, the 
virtual PPF under CRS shifts inward. That is why the welfare of the South would suffer as a 
result of moving towards free trade. In sum, the North-South trade in the presence of 
economies of scale is not mutually beneficial. Trade expansion along the pattern of 
comparative advantage would always make the world economy more efficient, but the North 
benefits at the expense of the South.   
The above discussion raises a new question: will free trade ever be beneficial to the 
South? The answer is: it depends. A necessary condition for the South to benefit from free 
trade in the present model is that it is completely specialized in the labor-intensive good. 
Furthermore, the terms of trade for the labor-intensive good must be sufficiently favorable to 
the South. To explain the intuition for this result, let us turn to Table 1. Row 15 shows the 
level of welfare when the economy is completely specialized in good 1 but can trade at the 
relative product price shown in Row 9. It is apparent that complete specialization in good 1 is JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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inferior to diversification. This is because diversification derives an efficiency gain from the 
scale effect in the production of good 2. Further, we can observe in Table 1 that the welfare 
level associated with complete specialization in good 1 is decreasing monotonically in p (or 
increasing in 1/p). In Table 1, US1 reaches the maximum (97.49) when p is at the minimum 
(0.89) and S2 is at the MES (30.33). Further, our numerical optimization shows that if p = 
0.88, then US1 would be equal to the utility (98.23) under diversification with S2 = 30.33. 
Therefore, unless p is equal to or less than 0.88, diversification yields more utility than 
complete specialization in good 1. In other words, the optimality of free trade that entails in 
complete specialization in good 1 depends on the terms of trade for the South. If the export 
price is sufficiently favorable to the South, then the South should be content with producing 
labor-intensive low-tech products that do not require large scale. 
Under what condition is it likely that p would be below 0.88, or the terms of trade for 
the South is sufficiently favorable? There are basically two determinants of the terms of trade 
for the South. One is the income elasticity of the demand for the good exported by the South. 
If the income elasticity of the demand for good 1 is sufficiently high, the terms of trade for 
the South may improve over time with economic growth, or at least do not deteriorate. The 
other factor is that for a single developing economy, the good it exports does not have close 
substitutes elsewhere in the world. In other words, the producer enjoys sizeable market 
power and can extract high mark-ups so that it enjoys favorable terms of trade. 
However, common sense suggests that neither of the two scenarios is likely for a 
typical developing economy. Most of the exports from developing economies are low-end 
consumer goods and the markets for such goods tend to be highly competitive in terms of 
price. Therefore, the South may have to live with a p that is well above 0.88 (i.e., low prices 
for their exports of good 1). Given that gloomy outlook for the South’s terms of trade, trade 
liberalization that leads to a contraction in the production of the scale-intensive good or even 
to complete specialization in good 1 in the South may well be welfare-reducing, contrary to 
what is predicted by most economists. In essence, the South is entrapped in the pitfall of 
immiserizing growth. Though trade expansion along the pattern of comparative advantage, in 
principle, improves the efficiency and welfare of the world economy as a whole, it does not 
always benefit every economy individually. Specialization in international production is 
efficient. But it matters critically in what goods an economy becomes specialized. If the 
South gets locked in producing goods that are less s cale-intensive (less potential for 
productivity improvement) and highly competitive (the terms of trade are more likely to 
deteriorate), then more trade may not be necessarily beneficial. 
The third justification for a supportive trade policy involves the following case. The 
South is initially completely specialized in good 1. Now the terms of trade for it has 
worsened such that p is larger than 0.88 at least, and may well be above the level (0.89) 
associated with MES of S2. Thus, it becomes desirable for that developing economy to get 
into producing good 2. However, production of good 2 can only expand gradually due to the 
resource constraint or the learning-by-doing constraint. In other words, instead of jumping to 
a new equilibrium point on the supply curve of good 2, that developing economy has to 
move along the supply curve gradually. In that situation, it is obvious that production of good 
2 may not be profitable initially when the output scale of good 2 is too small. In other words, 
good 2 may not be profitable initially, but will be viable when an adequate scale is attained. XU: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND THE NORTH-SOUTH TRADE 
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In this situation, there is a valid case for government support for sector 2. In a dynamic sense, 
this is the well-known infant-industry argument. Of course, it is often argued that the 
infant-industry argument is not valid in the presence of a perfect capital market that is 
populated with risk-neutral rational investors who can look patiently into the distant future. 
The spectacular recent stock market boom in the American economy deriving from the 
confidence in the emerging New Economy driven by the Internet Revolution and information 
technologies is a good example of what a well-functioning capital market can accomplish. 
However, a perfect capital market is a feature that most developing economies definitely 
lack. 
There is a further argument for government in the South to support sector 2 when we 
shift our attention to economic growth. As argued above, the Ricardian technological 
differences may well be a highly relevant determinant of comparative advantage for the 
North-South trade. It is very likely that the South is further behind the North technologically 
in sector 2 than in sector 1. For the South, productivity growth mainly means catching up 
with the level of technologies attained in the North, not generating inventions and 
innovations that shift outward the production frontier. On account of Ricardian technological 
differences, the South is likely to possess, as argued above, comparative advantage in good 1. 
Now let us further assume that the larger technological gaps are, the more potential 
there is for the South to catch up with the North. In other words, the potential for dynamic 
productivity gains is much larger in sector 2 than in sector 1. This feature is an empirical 
regularity widely observed in the real world. To the extent that sector 2 possesses more 
potential for productivity gains than sector 1, government support for sector 2 is warranted.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we present a formal trade model that synthesizes three distinct models of 
comparative advantage: the Ricardian model, the HO model and the model of external 
economies of scale. While the three distinct theories of comparative advantage are well 
known, a general model that incorporates all the three d eterminants of comparative 
advantage offers a perspective much richer in content and insights. In particular, as we have 
illustrated, the present model can present a more realistic picture of the North-South trade 
and can be used to formalize many important arguments that rationalize a legitimate role for 
governments in the South to assist and promote industrial upgrading that is essential for 
sustained growth and development. 
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Table 1   Simulation Results 
Row  Variable  Symbol  Simulation 
1  The supply of good 1  S1  184.20  183.07  172.98  162.82  158.54  142.65  100.00  51.95  0.16  0.00 
2  The supply of good 2  S2  0.00  1.00  12.50  25.00  30.33  50.00  100.00  150.00  197.00  197.14 
3  Net export of good 1  NX1    90.97  80.75  70.24  65.73  48.68  0.00 ꎭ59.72 ꎭ129.03   
4  Net export of good 2  NX2   ꎭ80.18 ꎭ87.87 ꎭ78.56 ꎭ73.65 ꎭ53.74  0.00  52.27  98.44   
5  Capital-labor ratio in sector 1  k 1  10.00  9.88  8.90  8.02  7.67  6.53  4.29  2.78  1.84   
6  Capital-labor ratio in sector 2  k 2    53.81  48.48  43.66  41.78  35.53  23.33  15.11  10.01  10.00 
7  The price of good 1  p1  0.78  0.78  0.80  0.83  0.84  0.88  1.00  1.14  1.29   
8  The price of good 2  p2    0.88  0.74  0.74  0.75  0.80  1.00  1.30  1.69  1.69 
9  Relative product price  p    1.13  0.92  0.89  0.89  0.91  1.00  1.14  1.31   
10  The wage rate  w  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
11  The rental rate  r  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.10  0.15  0.23  0.23 
12  Relative factor price  w  23.33  23.06  20.78  18.71  17.91  15.23  10.00  6.48  4.29  4.29 
13  GDP  Y  142.86  143.36  148.13  153.44  155.84  165.67  200.00  254.43  333.05  333.33 
14  Utility under diversification  UD    86.47  96.22  97.92  98.23  98.74  100.00  104.47  112.84   
15  Utility under specialization in good 1 US1    86.46  96.08  97.41  97.49  96.77  92.10  86.16  80.44   
Note: 1. The values of parameters and exogenous variables: a1 = 0.3, a2 = 0.7, A1 = 0.92, A2 = 0.23, e = 0.1; L = 100, K = 1,000; w = 1.0; b = 0.5. 
2. The benchmark equilibrium values of endogenous variables: p1 = p2 = 1.0, S1 = S2 = 100. 